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This paper investigates the impact of unskilled workers' earnings on crime.  Following the literature
on wage inequality and skill-biased technological change, we employ CPS data to create state-year
as well as state-year-and (broad) industry specific measures of skill-biased technological change, which
are then used as instruments for unskilled workers' earnings in crime regressions.  Regressions that
employ state panels reveal that technology-induced variations in unskilled workers' earnings impact
property crime with an elasticity of -1, but that wages have no impact on violent crime. The paper
also estimates, for the first time in this literature, structural crime equations using micro panel data
from NLSY97 and instrumenting real wages of young workers.   Using state-year-industry specific
technology shocks as instruments yields elasticities that are in the neighborhood of -2 for most types
of crime, which is markedly larger than previous estimates.  In both data sets there is evidence for
asymmetric impact of unskilled workers' earnings on crime.  A decline in earnings has a larger effect
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bunel@lsu.edu1 Introduction
This paper analyzes the impact of unskilled workers’ earnings on criminal propensity by
bringing together two strands of literature: the research on wage inequality and skill-
biased technological change, and literature on the impact of labor market conditions
on crime. A number of inﬂuential papers have documented the rapid growth in wage
inequality in the United States since the late 1970s (Autor et al., 2008; Katz and
Autor, 1999; Bound and Johnson, 1992; Katz and Murphy, 1992). It has been argued
that adoption of new technologies is positively correlated with the relative demand for
skilled workers (Doms et al., 1997; Autor et al., 1998), and the common view in the
literature is that technological change and the resultant increase in the demand for skill
have been major determinants of the rise in wage inequality (Acemoglu and Autor,
2010).1
Another line of research is concerned with the impact of legal market earnings on
crime. While the relationship is well-determined theoretically since the pioneering work
of Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973), empirical studies have been plagued with the
diﬃculty of credibly identifying the impact of wages on crime. Speciﬁcally, endogeneity
of legal labor market earnings in crime regressions has created a major challenge in
identifying the causal impact of legal labor market earnings on crime.
We investigate the extent to which variations in unskilled workers’ earnings, induced
by skill-biased technological change, cause crime. Following the literature on wage
inequality, we create a theoretically well-deﬁned construct of skill-biased technological
change, and employ this measure as an instrument for unskilled workers’ earnings in
crime regressions. In addition to analyzing an annual state panel spanning 1983 to
2005, we also analyze, for the ﬁrst time in this literature, a micro panel data set from
NLSY97 covering the years 1997 to 2003 while employing an instrumental variable.
1The slowdown in the relative supply of skilled workers is another potentially contributing factor
to the widening of the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers (Card and Lemieux, 2001).
1Results from state panels show that weekly earnings of unskilled workers have a
signiﬁcant impact on property crime with an elasticity of -1.0. Violent crime is not
inﬂuenced by unskilled workers’ earnings. We also ﬁnd that the impact of earnings on
crime is asymmetric. That is, a decline in real weekly earnings of unskilled workers has
a larger impact on crime than an equivalent increase in their earnings.
Using the NLSY97 panel, we ﬁnd that wages impact the propensity to commit
a variety of crimes ranging from theft to selling drugs, and that the elasticities are
substantially higher. Speciﬁcally, the estimated elasticities are in the neighborhood
of -2, indicating that movements in unskilled workers’ earnings are more signiﬁcantly
related to criminal activity than recognized before. The asymmetric impact of wages on
crime is also detected in micro data. While men’s wages cause their criminal activity,
women’s wages have no signiﬁcant impact on their criminal propensity.
The next section of the paper brieﬂy describes the previous research on wages and
crime, and puts the contribution of this paper in perspective. Section 3 presents a
simple theoretical framework. Section 4 presents the aggregate crime equation and the
asymmetry hypothesis. Section 5 explains the instrument –skill biased technological
change– that is employed in the paper. Section 6 describes the data used in the aggregate
(state panels) analysis and Section 7 displays the results obtained from aggregate data.
Section 8 describes the econometric setup of the analysis of micro data, section 9 explains
the data sets used in this analysis. Section 10 presents the results obtained from micro
data and Section 11 is the conclusion.
2 Previous Research and the Contribution of this
Paper
Although economic models of crime predict that legal market opportunities are nega-
tively related to criminal activity, identiﬁcation of the impact of labor market conditions
on crime has been a challenge because of empirical diﬃculties. This is especially true
2for the impact of wages on crime due to endogeneity of wages. In micro data an indi-
vidual’s market wage and his/her unobserved proclivity for criminal activity are likely
to be correlated. Criminal activity will also impact the relevant wages of the individual
because participation in the criminal sector deteriorates legal human capital (Mocan
et al., 2005). These endogeneity and reverse causality issues produce biased estimates
if such confounding is not carefully addressed. Grogger (1998) tackles these issues by
estimating a reduced form model using cross-sectional data from one year (1980) of
NLSY79 to explain the impact of wages on income from property crime. The estimated
coeﬃcients of the model are used in GMM to obtain the structural parameters, which
generate a wage elasticity of crime participation of -1.0.
An alternative strategy is to use aggregate crime data and to employ aggregate
indicators of labor market opportunities under the assumption that they are reasonably
exogenous to crime. For example, Machin and Meghir (2004) use average area wages
to explain area-level crime rates in England and Wales. Gould et al. (2002) employ
residuals of a state-level wage regression for males to explain county-level crime rates.
OLS regressions provide wage elasticity estimates for property crime, which are about
-0.9 in the former paper, and about -0.5 in the latter.
However, exogeneity of wages is questionable even in aggregate data. For example,
unobserved attributes of a state may impact legal labor market wages as well as criminal
activity. Furthermore, as implied by the results of Cullen and Levitt (1999), reverse
causality from crime rates to market wages is possible. These authors show that each
additional crime in a central city is associated with a net decline of population by
one resident. They further show that this net decline in population is due to the out-
migration of residents. Movements in the labor demand and labor supply as a result of
this crime-induced out-migration may inﬂuence market wages.2 Thus, it is desirable to
2There is arguably no reverse causality from the crime rates to the minimum wages because the
adjustments to minimum wages are determined largely by political, rather than economic factors, at
least in the U.S. Hashimoto (1987) employed aggregate U.S. time series data and used arrests as a proxy
for crime in analyzing the impact of minimum wages on crime. Corman and Mocan (2005) use monthly
3ﬁnd an instrument that is correlated with wages at the local level, but not related to
crime.
It has been a major challenge to ﬁnd a convincing and uncomplicated instrument,
even in aggregate data. For example, in addition to their OLS speciﬁcations, Gould
et al. (2002) also run instrumental variables regressions of county-level crime rates on
state-level wages, where the instrument for state wages consists of the product of three
elements: the industrial composition of the state in the beginning of the sample year,
the national industrial composition trends in employment in each industry and the
change in demographic composition in each industry at the national level. The wage
elasticity obtained from this instrument is about -1.1 for property crimes.
There are only a handful of crime studies that employed panel data on individu-
als, but these studies investigate the impact of the local unemployment rate, rather
than individual wages.3 Furthermore, there is no crime study that has employed an
instrumental variables strategy using individual-level data.
The contribution of this paper is three-fold. First, following closely the literature on
wage inequality, it creates a straightforward and theoretically well-deﬁned instrument
for the earnings of unskilled workers and employs it to identify the eﬀect of wages on
crime. Second, this is the ﬁrst paper to employ an individual-level panel data and an
time series data from New York City to investigate the impact of economic conditions, including the
minimum wage and deterrence measures on crime. However, unobserved local characteristics may be
correlated both with the level of minimum wages and the crime propensity. Hansen and Machin (2002)
analyze the impact of a national minimum wage increase in the U.K. in 1999 by exploiting regional
diﬀerence in crime rates and in the proportion of low-paid workers.
3Williams and Sickles (2002) use 426 men ages 19 to 24 over the period of 1977-82 that are part of
the 1958 Philadelphia Birth Cohort Study. Mocan and Bali (2010) employ more than 27,000 individuals
in the same data, and focus on the impact of the unemployment rate. A number of studies investigated
the impact of unemployment on crime using instruments for the unemployment rate in aggregate panel
data (e.g. panel of states– Lin, 2008, Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001; or panel of municipalities–
¨ Oster and Agell, 2007). The typical instrument in these papers consists of an interaction of two or more
variables, such as the interaction of the initial sectoral composition of employment in each aggregate
unit with the national composition trends in employment (¨ Oster and Agell, 2007), the interaction of the
share of manufacturing employment in the aggregate unit and the change in the relative price of crude
oil, or the interaction of the change in real exchange rates with the share of the state manufacturing
employment, or the state union membership in the aggregate unit (Lin, 2008).
4instrumental variables strategy to investigate the impact of unskilled workers’ wages
on crime. Speciﬁcally, it employs NLSY97 to analyze the behavior of young, unskilled
workers, in addition to using more standard state-level panel data. The wage elasticities
obtained using our instrument on micro panel data are substantially larger than previous
estimates reported in the literature.4 Third, it investigates, in both data sets, whether
a decrease in earnings of unskilled workers has a larger impact on criminal propensity
than an equivalent increase in earnings.
3 Theoretical Framework
Standard theoretical models developed by Becker (1968) and Ehrlich (1973) postulate
that optimizing individuals evaluate the expected monetary costs and beneﬁts of par-
ticipating in the legal labor market and in the market for oﬀenses. Individuals also
form expectations about the certainty and severity of punishment and make decisions
on their criminal activity and on labor supply to the legal market. In this framework,
as the return to legal human capital (wages in the legal labor market) goes up, the
propensity to engage in crime goes down. This basic insight can be demonstrated using
the simple static model of Grogger (1998) who follows Gronau (1977), where the indi-
vidual maximizes a utility function U(C,L), where C stands for consumption and L is
leisure time devoted to non-market activity.5 Total available time T is spent between
leisure, the amount of time allocated to the legal labor market Tm, and the amount of
time devoted to crime, Tc, such that T = L + Tm + Tc. The budget constraint of the
individual is C = Y +WTm+R(Tc), where Y stands for unearned income, W represents
wages faced by the individual in the legal labor market, and R is the returns-to-crime
schedule, which is a concave function of Tc. The concavity represents the diminishing
4Gould et al. (2002) and Grogger (1998) used NLSY79, but they could only use data from one year
(1980); so they ran cross-sectional regressions.
5Recent dynamic economic models propose a richer interplay between investment in human capital
and crime (Mocan et al., 2005; Lochner, 2004), but the main insight regarding the impact of returns
to human capital is the same.
5marginal returns to crime.
As detailed in Grogger (1998), the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between
consumption and leisure is MRS(C,L) = F(Tm,Y +R(Tc),L+Tm), where Tm and Tc are
choice variables. If W0 stands for the reservation wage of the individual, he will work in
the labor market if W > W0. Similarly, he will commit crime if R′(Tc) = ∂R/∂Tc > W0.
An individual who allocates time to both crime and the labor market ﬁnds the optimal
crime hours where marginal return to an extra hour of crime is equal to the market
wage; i.e. where R′(Tc) = W is satisﬁed.6 It is straightforward to show that a decrease
in legal wages W increases the individuals’ optimal allocation of time to crime.
The basic theoretical framework described above allows us to estimate a crime par-
ticipation equation using micro data, the details of which are presented in Sections
8-10. It also provides guidance for an aggregate (state-level) crime equation, which is
discussed in the next section.
4 Analysis of Aggregate Data
The theoretical framework described in the previous section suggests a formulation as
depicted by equation (1) below
CR = F(W,X,D), (1)
where CR stands for the extent of criminal activity, W represent the relevant market
wages, X is a vector of variables including unearned income and other attributes that
may be correlated with tastes and contextual inﬂuences, and D stands for measures of
deterrence variables that may capture the cost of crime.
Within this framework and following the literature that employs aggregate crime
data (Corman and Mocan, 2000; Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001; Gould et al., 2002),
6The expected costs of crime, such as those associated with the certainty and severity of punishment,
can be thought of as having been incorporated into the shape of the returns-to-crime schedule R(Tc):
6we estimate the following model
CR
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st is the crime rate of type–c crime (c=robbery, burglary, motor vehicle theft,
etc.) in state s and year t. Wst stands for the real weekly earnings of unskilled workers
in state s and year t. Xst represents time-varying state attributes such as per capita
income, and Dc stands for the arrest rate for the corresponding crime (for example,
if the dependent variable is the robbery rate, D stands for the robbery arrest rate; if
the dependent variable is the burglary rate, D stands for the burglary arrest rate, and
so on). µc
s stands for unobservable state attributes that inﬂuence crime type c in that
state, λc
t represents the time trend and year ﬁxed eﬀects, and εc
st is a random error
term. The details of the variables and the data sources are provided in the data section
below.
As shown by Mocan et al. (2005) and Mocan and Bali (2010), the impact of eco-
nomic conditions on crime is expected to by asymmetric. A decline in economic op-
portunity (decline in market wages or increase in the unemployment rate) increases
criminal propensity. As participation in crime goes up, legal human capital depreciates
and criminal human capital appreciates. This makes it diﬃcult to reduce the extent
of criminal activity following the improvement in labor market conditions. Thus, the
impact of a deterioration in real weekly earnings on crime is expected to be larger in
magnitude than the impact of an increase in weekly earnings by the same absolute mag-
nitude. To test this hypothesis we deﬁne the crime rate as an asymmetric function of
weekly earnings (W), where the conditional mean of the crime rate is speciﬁed to follow
two diﬀerent paths depending on the change (increase or decrease) in W as follows
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Wst if Wst < Wst−1
0 otherwise .
7This speciﬁcation allows us to investigate whether an increase in weekly earnings has




As described previously, it is obvious that labor market earnings are an endogenous
variable in crime regressions when the unit of observation is the individual. Similar
empirical diﬃculties exist in aggregate data. For example, unobserved attributes of a
state may impact labor market wages as well as criminal activity. Because of these
concerns, we employ an instrumental variables strategy, where the weekly wages of
unskilled workers are instrumented by a measure of skill-biased technological change.
Following the framework of Autor et al. (1998) and Autor et al. (2008), we calculate an
index of relative demand shifts favoring skilled workers, as detailed in the next section.
5 The Instrument
Consider the following CES production function in which skilled and unskilled labor











where H and L stand for eﬃciency-adjusted skilled and unskilled labor inputs (employ-
ment), respectively. AH and AL represent factor-augmenting technology terms. Varia-
tions of this production function have been widely used in similar contexts (Katz and
Murphy, 1992; Acemoglu, 1998 and 2002; Ciccone and Peri, 2005; Caselli and Coleman,
2006; Autor et al., 2008).7 The parameter σ is the elasticity of substitution between
skilled and unskilled labor and is assumed to be greater than unity. Thus, skill-neutral















where K denotes capital stock, AK stands for capital-augmenting technology, and  2 (0;1) and  > 0
are time invariant parameters. Assuming that markets are competitive, the ﬁrst-order conditions still
yield equation (5).
8technological improvement raises AH and AL by the same proportion, while skill-biased
technological change increases AH/AL.
Under the assumption of competitive factor markets, the ﬁrst order conditions yield















where WH and WL stand for eﬃciency-adjusted wages of skilled and unskilled labor,
respectively.8 With data on wages and labor supply of both skilled and unskilled labor,
AHst/ALst can be backed out for each state and year from equation (5), given that σ is
known.
There is a large body of research that estimates the elasticity of substitution between
skilled and unskilled labor and the estimates are between 1.4 and 2.9 In our analysis, we
set σ = 1.6 which is consistent with more recent estimates (e.g., Autor et al., 2008). As
equation (5) depicts, σ = 1.6 implies that a 10% increase in the relative supply of skilled
labor should lower their relative wage by about 6.3% in the absence of technological
change. The relative supply of skilled labor (i.e., college educated workers) has been
rising over the last several decades in the U.S., but this rise has been accompanied by
a well-documented increase in the relative wages of these workers. These facts imply
that, as shown by equation (5), AH/AL has been rising. Put diﬀerently, the observed
increase in wage inequality in favor of skilled workers in the presence of the sustained
increase in the relative supply of skill suggests an increase in AH/AL, which represents
skill-biased technological change.
We employ ln(AH/AL) as an index for skill-biased technological change (Autor et al.,
8The creation of eﬃciency-adjusted H, L, WH and WL is described in the Appendix.
9Using the CPS data over 1963-87, Katz and Murphy (1992) estimate that  is about 1.4. Autor et
al. (2008) extend the period to 2005, and ﬁnd that it is around 1.6. Krusell et al. (2000), on the other
hand, ﬁnd that the elasticity is about 1.7. Using a state-level panel data, Ciccone and Peri (2005)
ﬁnd this elasticity to be around 1.5. Based on extensive econometric estimates, Autor et al. (1998)
conclude that this elasticity is unlikely to be greater than 2.
91998; Autor et al., 2008; Goldin and Katz, 2007).10 This index of state-and-year speciﬁc
relative demand shifts in favor of skilled labor is used as an instrument for wages of
unskilled labor in each state and year in the analysis of state-level panel data.11 When
we estimate models which include W + and W − as regressors (see Equation 3), we
construct the corresponding instruments using ln(AH/AL), the same way W + and W −
are generated.
Although a change in ln(AH/AL) can arise for a variety of reasons, ranging from
variations in the relative prices of non-labor inputs to international trade and to the
evolution of labor market institutions, the consensus in the literature is that the primary
driver of ln(AH/AL) is skill-biased technological change (Autor et al., 2008; Goldin
and Katz, 2007).12 A related point is whether skill-biased technological change and
the resultant change in the relative demand for skilled workers would induce a policy
reaction, which would render our instrument invalid. For example, if state governments
increase minimum wages in reaction to a change in technology favoring skilled workers,
the instrument would be invalid to the extent that the minimum wage has a direct
impact on crime. However, the scenario that states increase the level of minimum wages
in response to technology shocks does not seem realistic because minimum wages are not
adjusted frequently. Between 1980 and 2005 there were six increases in the minimum
10We use ln(AH=AL) rather than ln(AH) and ln(AL); separately, for two reasons. First, ln(AH=AL)
directly measures skilled-biased technical change. Second, calculation of ln(AH) and ln(AL) requires
the exact speciﬁcation of the production function (Caselli and Coleman, 2006; Unel, 2010) along with
data on capital stocks and rental prices, which are not available. Furthermore, a production function
such as the one depicted in footnote 7 involves unknown parameters  and . Calculation of AH and
AL is even more diﬃcult at the individual-level panel analysis, because it requires data on the price of
output in each industry in each state, which are not available either.
11 It has been suggested that the rise in earnings inequality in the early 1980s was an episodic event,
mostly driven by the decline in the real minimum wage (Card and DiNardo, 2002). On the other
hand, Autor et al., (2008) ﬁnd limited support for this claim. They argue that the pattern of wage
inequality between 1963 and 2005 is explained by a modiﬁed version of the skill-biased technological
change hypothesis.
12Minimum wage is an example of an institutional factor tat may have impacted the wage gap
between skilled and unskilled labor. Although Lee (1999) argues that minimum wage can account for
the rise in the inequality in the lower tail of the wage distribution, Autor et al. (2010) ﬁnd that the
impact of minimum wage on overall wage inequality is modest, and it is almost negligible for males.
10wage mandated by the federal government, but the average number of state-induced
increases was 3.5 during the same period. Running a regression of the logarithm of
state minimum wages (the greater of the federal or the state) on state-level ln(AH/AL)
by controlling for state and time ﬁxed-eﬀects produced a coeﬃcient of 0.001 with a
p-value of 0.87.13 This indicates that minimum wage is not impacted by variations in
skill-biased technology shocks.
It is possible that states react to technology shocks that create a labor market
disadvantage for unskilled workers in ways that are more subtle than minimum wage
increases. We consider two state welfare expenditures and investigate whether states
alter these expenditures in reaction to changes in the skill-biased technology index. The
ﬁrst expenditure item, welfare cash spending, measures cash assistance to individuals.
It includes all state expenditures on cash programs as well as AFDC/TANF and assis-
tance programs not under federal categorical programs (e.g., general assistance, refugee
assistance, home relief, and emergency relief). The second variable, non-cash welfare,
includes medical vendor payment beneﬁts to individuals through Medicaid, state chil-
drens health insurance program (SCHIP), administration of medical and cash assistance,
general relief, vendor, nursing homes and welfare institutions owned and operated by a
government.14 Thus the welfare expenditure measures include the amount contributed
by the state and federal matches. Running a regression of the logarithm of real welfare
cash spending on ln(AH/AL) produces a coeﬃcient of -0.09 with a p-value of 0.29, and
the estimated coeﬃcient is 0.02 (p=0.45) when the logarithm of real non-cash welfare
spending is the dependent variable.15
13Minimum wage is the greater of the federal and state minimum wage in a year. It is obtained from
documents found at state departments of labor websites, the Monthly Labor Review publication of
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, or from other oﬃcial government documents. The time period of the
regression, 1983-2005, is the same as the period covered by the state panel analyzed in section analyzed
in the next two sections. Variations in this speciﬁcation in various ways did not change neither the
point estimate nor the statistical signiﬁcance of the estimated coeﬃcient of ln(AH=AL).
14These data are obtained from U.S. Census Bureau, Annual Survey of State Government Finances
and Census Government.
15As in the case with the minimum wage regression, these models contain state and time ﬁxed eﬀects.
11These results indicate that states do not react in systematic ways to increase the
minimum wage or welfare spending in order to counteract the potentially adverse ef-
fects on unskilled workers produced by shocks in skill-biased technology. This could
be because state governors and state legislature cannot easily recognize these shocks,
or alternatively, they may not worry about the impact of these shocks on unskilled
workers.16
When we analyze micro data from the NLSY97, we follow the same procedure
to create the instrument, with one diﬀerence. We generate state-year-and-industry
speciﬁc measures of relative demand shifts (AHjst/ALjst,) in each state s, year t, and for
three broad industry categories (service, manufacturing, and other industries) j. These
measures are matched with workers in the NLSY by the industry of employment. Those
who are unemployed are matched with state-wide skill-biased technological change for
each year. The details of the micro data analysis are presented in Section 8 and the
details of the creation of skill-biased technological change measure are displayed in the
Appendix.
6 Data Used in State Panel
We follow the literature on wage inequality to construct measures of earnings and
employment for both skilled and unskilled labor (e.g. Autor et al. 2008). Speciﬁcally,
we use the March Current Population Survey (CPS) from 1980 to 2006 that provide
information on prior year’s annual earnings and weeks worked. We focus on weekly
earnings, which are constructed by dividing total annual earnings (from wages and
Neither the estimated coeﬃcient, nor statistical signiﬁcance changed appreciably when the speciﬁcation
was altered by, for example, by adding state-speciﬁc trends, or by adding lagged values of the index of
skill-biased technology.
16This result is not surprising because even if skill-biased technology shocks were immediately ob-
servable, state’s reaction to such shocks to protect unskilled workers would require political support,
which is not likely to be strong as unskilled low-income workers have little inﬂuence in state politics
(Rose-Ackerman, 2003).
12salaries) in the previous year by the number of weeks worked.17 Following Gould et
al. (2002), we construct average weekly earnings by considering all employed people
between 16 and 64 years of age (excluding self-employed workers) and who work on
a full-time basis (deﬁned as working 35-plus hours per week). They are deﬂated by
state-speciﬁc price deﬂators from Berry et al. (2000). Consistent with our econometric
speciﬁcation and much of the literature, we classify non-college educated individuals
(those with 12 or fewer years of schooling) as unskilled labor, and those with at least
some college education (13 or more years) are classiﬁed as skilled workers. The appendix
provides a complete description of the data sets and construction of aggregate variables.
Uniform Crime Reports data, pertaining to speciﬁc FBI index crimes (burglary,
larceny, motor vehicle theft, robbery, murder, rape and aggravated assault) are obtained
from the Bureau of Justice Statistics. Arrests for each speciﬁc crime type are compiled
from hardcopies of the uniform crime reports. To avoid ratio bias, arrest rates are
calculated by deﬂating arrests by population, rather than by oﬀenses. In this calculation
we used the state population covered by police agencies reporting to the FBI, also
obtained from the Uniform Crime Reports. The percentage of state population living
in urban areas, percentage black, and percentage aged 15 to 24 are based on the Census
information. Per capita personal disposable income in the state is obtained from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the unemployment rate data are provided by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics. Per capita beer consumption (which is obtained from the
National Institutes of Health) is used as a proxy for alcohol consumption in each state.
The descriptive statistics of the data are provided in Table 1.
Figures 1A-6A display the eﬃciency-adjusted real weekly earnings of unskilled work-
17Several authors (e.g., Lemieux, 2006; Autor et al., 2008) indicate that the March CPS data are
not ideal for analyzing the hourly wage distribution since they lack a point-in-time wage measure, and
the data on usual weekly hours are noisy. This creates substantial measurement error in estimates.
Therefore, following much of the literature, we focus on weekly earnings. May/ORG data, which is
another potential source, have undergone a serious re-design in mid-1990s which created substantial
problems. Acemoglu and Autor (2010) indicate that the non-response rate to earnings in the May/ORG
increased from 15% in 1993 to 23% in 1994 and reached 31% in 2001.
13ers as well as the crime rates in a sample of states from diﬀerent regions of the country.
There is signiﬁcant heterogeneity in the behavior of the crime rates. For example,
Louisiana’s crime rate went up rather steadily between 1980 and 1996, and started
declining afterwards. On the other hand, the crime rate in Texas reached its peak in
1988, and the crime rate in Maine has declined since 1980 with some jumps in late
1980s and mid 1990s. The crime rate in California declined in the early 1980s, then
remained steady for a decade, and dropped signiﬁcantly between 1993 and 1999. In
contrast, crime went up between mid-1980s and early 1990s in Massachusetts before it
subsequently started declining, and the crime in West Virginia went up, rather than
decline, between early1980s and 2005.
Figures 1B-6B present the eﬃciency-adjusted real weekly earnings of unskilled work-
ers in the same states. In some states, there is a visible negative correlation between
crime and real weekly earnings of unskilled workers. For example, in Louisiana, earnings
of unskilled workers went down between 1980 and 1991, and they bounced and started
going up after 1991. Crime in Louisiana increased between 1980 and 1996, and declined
afterwards. In Maine, real weekly earnings of unskilled workers were going up between
1980 and 2005 when crime was declining. The opposite was happening in West Virginia
Crime during the same period. Real earnings steadily declined in Texas between 1980
and 1992, and they started increasing afterwards. Crime in Texas exhibits the reverse
pattern. On the other hand, the correlation between crime and earnings of unskilled
workers is not strong in Massachusetts and in California.18 Note that Figures 1B-6B
display eﬃciency-adjusted real weekly earnings of unskilled workers (see the Appendix
for the construction). The level of simple weekly earnings (unadjusted for education,
experience or gender composition) are higher, but both follow the same time-series
18 These particular states are not anomalies in any sense. Analysis of other states shows that the
behavior of the crime rate is quite diﬀerent between the states. For example, the crime rate in Florida
increased steadily between 1984 and 2005, while Michigan exhibited a continuous decline in crime.
Similarly, there is heterogeneity between states regarding the simple correlation between the crime
rate and earnings of unskilled workers. For example, the two variables move in opposite direction in
Mississippi over time, while the relationship is less clear in Indiana.
14pattern in a state.
7 Estimation Results of the State-Level Panel Data
Tables 2A and 2B present the instrumental variables results where aggregate property
crime, aggregate violent crime, and their components (i.e. burglary, larceny, murder,
and so on) are regressed on unskilled workers’ real earnings, arrests rates for the corre-
sponding crimes and other time-varying state attributes. Earnings of unskilled workers
are instrumented with ln(AH/AL) from equation (5). The instrument is powerful in
each case, and the F-statistic of the instrument in the ﬁrst stage regressions is about
71. Regressions also control for state and time ﬁxed-eﬀects and a time-trend; the stan-
dard errors are clustered at the state level. Following Levitt (1998), Corman and Mocan
(2000), and Katz et al. (2003), arrest rates are lagged once to minimize the impact of
simultaneity between crime and deterrence.
The framework of the skill-biased technological change depicted by Equations (4)
and (5) and the literature on wage inequality assume that wages are determined on
inelastic relative supply of the skill groups (Autor et al., 1998; Autor et al., 2008;
Acemoglu and Autor, 2010). Deviations from full-employment are implicitly ruled out,
but they can take place idiosyncratically because of cyclical conditions. This suggests
that one can incorporate unemployment to this analysis as an exogenous variable as
was done in the analysis of wage inequality (e.g. Autor et al., 2008). Thus, models
presented in Tables 2A and 2B include state unemployment rates, but dropping them
has no eﬀect on the magnitude or statistical signiﬁcance of other coeﬃcients.
Column (1) of Table 2A shows that the IV-estimate of the coeﬃcient of unskilled
(non-college) workers’ weekly earnings is -9.2 in the total property crime regression
and it is highly signiﬁcant. The estimate suggests that a $20 increase in weekly real
earnings of unskilled workers (which corresponds to a 5% increase at the sample mean)
reduces property crime rate by 184 (or about 9,670 fewer property crimes in a state in
15a year), which corresponds to a 4.4% decline. This suggests an elasticity of property
crime with respect to real weekly earnings of -0.9. Columns (2) and (3) show that an
increase in weekly earnings of unskilled workers reduces two components of property
crime: burglary and larceny, but it has no impact on motor-vehicle theft. A $20 increase
in weekly earnings of unskilled workers generates a decline in the burglary rate by about
56, or 6%, which translates into 3,160 fewer burglaries. The same increase in earnings
brings about a decline in the larceny rate by 150 (5.4%). This suggests that the elasticity
of burglary and larceny with respect to earnings of unskilled workers is in the range of
-1.1 to -1.2. The coeﬃcient of unskilled workers’ earnings is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero in violent crime regressions.
Table 2A also shows that state alcohol consumption is positively related to crime and
that the arrest rate has a negative impact on most crimes and the impact is estimated
with precision in case of burglary, larceny, and total property crime. Lagging the arrest
rate twice or omitting it from the models did not alter the estimated coeﬃcients of
weekly earnings.19 Per capita state income has a negative impact on motor vehicle
thefts and robberies.
Table 2B displays the results of the instrumental variables regressions which include
Weekly Earnings+ and Weekly Earnings− as two separate regressors. The ﬁrst stage
regressions of this speciﬁcation use ln(AH/AL)+ and ln(AH/AL)− as instruments, which
are constructed the same way as Weekly Earnings+ and Weekly Earnings−. The F-value
for the instruments are between 45 and 50.20 Column (1) of Table 2B shows that a
decrease in unskilled workers’ weekly earnings has a larger impact on total property
crime than an increase in earnings by the same magnitude. That is, the coeﬃcient of
Weekly Earnings− is larger in absolute value than that of Weekly Earnings+, and the
diﬀerence is statistically diﬀerent from zero at the ﬁve percent level. Speciﬁcally, if real
19In models that omitted the deterrence variables, estimated coeﬃcients of weekly earnings were
larger in absolute value in most cases.
20The ﬁrst stage regressions are not identical between speciﬁcations because each crime type regres-
sion (burglary, larceny, etc.) has its own speciﬁc arrest rate as part of the explanatory variables.
16weekly earnings of unskilled workers go down by $10, the property crime rate goes up
by about 184, which corresponds to an increase in the number of property crimes by
about 9,700.21 On the other hand, if weekly earnings increase by $10, the property
crime rate goes down by only 173, which translates into a decline in the number of
property crimes by 9,120. The same asymmetry is detected in the impact of weekly
earnings of unskilled workers on burglary and larceny. In both cases, a decline in real
weekly earnings has a larger impact on criminal activity than an increase in weekly
earnings by the same magnitude. The diﬀerence in the eﬀects is statistically diﬀerent
from zero at the 8-percent level for burglary, and at the 2-percent level for larceny.
An increase in the unemployment rate increases robberies, which is a violent crime
that has a monetary motive. The estimated coeﬃcients in tables 2A and 2B imply
that a one-percentage point increase in the state unemployment rate increases property
crime rate by 72-108, which translates into an increase in property crimes by about 2
percent. This magnitude is remarkably similar to the ones reported by previous research
(Freeman and Rodgers, 2000; Gould et al., 2002; Corman and Mocan, 2005). The same
one-percentage point increase in the unemployment rate generates a 3.8 perecnt increase
in robberies.
Very similar results to those reported in Tables 2A-2B are obtained when composition-
adjusted (instead of eﬃciency-adjusted) wages and the corresponding skill-biased tech-
nology measure are used in regressions.22 Estimating the models using OLS, by treating
the weekly earnings of unskilled workers as exogenous, provided estimates of earnings
that were mostly positive and sometimes statistically diﬀerent from zero. At its face,
this would suggest that an increase in weekly earnings of non-college workers would
increase crime, and it underlines the importance of addressing endogeneity.
21The coeﬃcients of Weekly Earnings+ and Weekly Earnings  are larger in comparison to the
coeﬃcients of Weekly Earnings reported in Table 2B because the mean values of Weekly Earnings+
and Weekly Earnings  are smaller than Weekly Earnings by construction (see equation 3).
22See the Appendix for the details of composition-adjusted wages.
178 Analysis of Micro Data
Based on the theoretical framework summarized in Section 3 above, and following Grog-
ger (1998), in this section we estimate a structural crime participation equation using
data from NLSY97. Speciﬁcally, consider the following equations:
lnW = X
′






Ψ + λTc + µ, (6b)
where (6a) is a standard Mincerian equation for market wages W, and (6b) speciﬁes
the marginal returns to crime, where Tc represents time spent committing crime, and
R′(Tc) = ∂R(Tc)/∂Tc stands for the returns to committing crime. The subscripts are
suppressed for simplicity. The variables X and D stand for the vector of personal
attributes and state characteristics, including deterrence.
As described in Section 3, if the person is engaged in crime, it should be the case
that R′(Tc = 0) > lnW. This indicates that the probability of committing crime,
Pr(CR = 1), can be depicted as Pr(CR = 1) = Pr(X
′Φ + D′Ψ + µ   lnW > 0) or




Equation (7) can be estimated by maximum likelihood probit, but two complications
exist. First, market wages W are not observed for those who don’t work in the labor
market, and estimating equation (7) using only those who work could produce sample
selection bias. Second, ε and µ in equations (6a) and (6b) are likely to be correlated.
That is, unobserved factors that inﬂuence labor market productivity may be correlated
with unobservables that impact productivity in the criminal sector, which constitutes
a potential source of endogeneity of wages. To address the ﬁrst issue, we specify a
selection equation that classiﬁes individuals into worker vs. non-worker groups and
estimates it along with the wage equation using full maximum likelihood. Identiﬁcation
is achieved by including unearned income in the selection equation and excluding it from
18the wage equation. Alternative identiﬁcation restrictions, such as including indicators
of marijuana use and gun ownership in addition to household income, provided the same
results. This selectivity-corrected wage equation is used to impute the market wages of
non-workers.
To address the endogeneity of wages, we instrument wages with skill-biased tech-
nological change index as explained in section 5. Because each worker’s sector of work
is known in the data, we classiﬁed workers into three groups as working in the service
sector, in the manufacturing sector, or in other sectors (which consists of agriculture,
mining and construction). We calculated the index of skill-biased technology for each
state, year, and sector using the algorithm described in the Appendix. More speciﬁcally,
we speciﬁed production functions for the manufacturing sector, service sector and the
residual (all other) sectors which depend on skilled and unskilled labor as before and
recovered the index for the skill-biased technology using equation (5).
We then matched each worker in each state, year and sector with the corresponding
sector-state-and year speciﬁc skill-biased technology index. Because the sector aﬃliation
is unknown for non-workers, we matched them by year, with the state-and-year speciﬁc
skill-biased technology index-the one that is used in the state-panel analysis of the
paper. In this framework we estimate
CR
c
ist = βcWist + X
′









where CRist stands for an indicator of various types of criminal activity (i.e., the sub-
script c stands for theft, stealing cars, drug sales, etc.) for person i who resides in state
s in time t, and the vector X stands for personal attributes of the person. D represents
a vector of time-varying state characteristics which includes aggregate measures of de-
terrence, such as the age-speciﬁc arrest rates for various crimes. Wist is the logarithm
of the market wages of worker i, in state s, and time t, instrumented with skill-biased
technological change, ζi represents unobserved time-invariant individual heterogeneity,
φs stands for state ﬁxed-eﬀects, λt represents the time ﬁxed eﬀects, and ν stands for the
19error term. As in the case of state panels, we also investigate the asymmetric impact
of wages on crime.
9 Micro Data from the NLSY97
We use conﬁdential geo-coded National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1997 cohort
(NLSY97). The main data set is constructed using information from the 1997 - 2003
waves of the NLSY97, which contains a nationally representative sample of 8,984 youths.
The individuals in the sample were aged 12 to 16 as of December 31st 1996, indicating
that the sample consists of young and unskilled (low educated) people, with average
age of about 18 (see Table 3). The respondents have been followed annually since the
survey was initiated. We limit the sample to the 1997–2003 waves because everyone
who took the survey between these years was asked of questions on criminal activity.
After 2003 crime questions were asked to those who had reported to have been arrested
in previous waves in addition to a small group of not-arrested respondents.
We employ seven diﬀerent indicators of delinquency. They are robbery, which is a
violent crime, and six categories of property crimes such as whether the person com-
mitted burglary, whether he/she stole a car, whether he/she sold or helped selling hard
drugs like cocaine, and whether he/she sold any drugs. Other crime measures include
stealing a purse, a wallet, or stealing something from a store (which is titled Larceny);
and whether the person received, possessed or sold stolen property, committed em-
bezzlement and fraud. This last category is called Stolen Property We also employ a
variable to indicate if the person committed Larceny, Car Theft or Robbery.23
In each wave, individuals are asked about the jobs they have taken since the last
23These outcome variables are constructed based on a series of questions in the following form “Have
you done X since the last interview?” where X stands for various crimes mentioned in the text. From
1998-2003 all crime questions were asked in that form. In the ﬁrst wave in 1997, the question was
“Have you ever done X?” followed by “How many times have you committed X in the last 12 months?”
or “How old were you when you last did X?” Thus, we used these variables to construct the outcome
variables for the ﬁrst wave.
20interview. Respondents report up to 11 diﬀerent jobs as well as the hourly compensation
they have received in each job. Highest hourly compensation reported for the year is
used as the relevant wage. To eliminate outliers, observations above the 95th percentile
of the wage distribution are omitted. Finally, the wage rate is deﬂated by the state-level
CPI.
Some of the individuals in our sample reported that they have not worked since the
date of last interview. Their market wages are predicted by estimating jointly a labor
force participation equation and a market wage equation. The exclusion restriction for
the selection equation is to omit conventional non-labor income from the wage equa-
tion. Non-labor income is deﬁned as the diﬀerence between individual’s total household
income and his/her personal labor income. As a result, our non-labor income measure
includes the following income types: child support, interest from bank accounts, divi-
dends from stocks or mutual funds, rental income, income received from the parents,
and from other sources (except own farms/businesses or salaries).
NLSY97 includes information about the industry classiﬁcations of individuals’ jobs.
We used the 2002 Census deﬁnitions of the industries.24 After matching individuals with
their industries, we used the technology shocks as an instrumental variable. Obviously,
those individuals who reported not having worked since the date of the last interview
do not belong to an industry. Consequently, we modiﬁed our instrumental variable such
that the non-working people are matched with the overall technology shocks.
Individual control variables include whether the person has carried a gun in the
last year, individual’s age, an indicator for whether the individual has at least a high
school degree (including GED), individual’s household income (income from all sources
in the family) and household size, indicators for marital status, number of biological
children the individual has (regardless of whether they live in individual’s household),
an indicator for whether the individual lives in an urban area, and the number of days
24The Census Bureau has reclassiﬁed some of the jobs in 2002. We utilized this new classiﬁcation.
21in the last month the individual has consumed more than 5 alcoholic beverages and
used marijuana.25 In addition, we use state level control variables. They consist of
per capita personal income in individual’s state, share of the population aged between
ﬁfteen and twenty four and share of the population that is black in the state.
County-level arrest data are obtained from Uniform Crime Reporting Program
(County-Level Detailed Arrest and Oﬀense Data sets for years between 1997 and 2004).
These data provide the number of juvenile and adult arrests in each county for several
crime categories including the Index I crimes and minor crimes such as drug sale, fraud,
embezzlement, vandalism and so on. Using the population of each county, we calculated
per capita (times 100,000) adult and juvenile arrests for motor vehicle theft, robbery,
larceny, and burglary. For hard drugs, we used the arrests pertaining to the sale and
manufacturing of cocaine and opium; and for any drug we used the arrests pertaining
to the sale and manufacturing of any narcotics. For Other Property Crime, we used the
arrest rates for forgery, fraud, embezzlement and buying/receiving/possessing stolen
property. For Any Property Crime, we used the sum of the property crime arrests and
robbery arrests. We matched the individuals in our sample with the relevant arrest
rates by their county and according to the crime they have committed and whether
they are older or younger than 18 years of age. For example, somebody who is younger
than 18 is matched with juvenile arrest rates and those with age greater than or equal
to 18 are matched with adult arrest rate in the county with the speciﬁc crimes.
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics. The regressions include the individuals
who have contributed at least two observations to the sample. The reported descriptive
statistics pertain to our largest sample - regressions reported in column (1) of Table
6A.26
25Urban classiﬁcation has been changed in 2003 by the NLSY (because the Census classiﬁcation was
changed in 2000). We employed the deﬁnition as reported in the NLSY.
26The means of the county level arrest rates are smaller in comparison to the means of the state
level arrest rates (reported in Table 1). This is because of three reasons. First, the sample includes
individuals from small counties in which there are very few arrests for some crime types. This pulls
the sample average down. Second, when calculating the arrest rates, we deﬂated the total number of
2210 Estimation Results Using Micro Data
Table 4 presents the results obtained from estimation of the selection equation and
the market wage equation. The two equations are estimated jointly using maximum
likelihood. The results are consistent with those obtained from typical wage studies
where having at least a high school degree and being male have a positive impact on
wages, but being Black has a negative impact on wages in comparison to whites. State
income and living in urban areas are positively correlated with wages. Non-labor income
has a negative impact on the propensity to work in the legal labor market; the same is
true for state income and the unemployment rate. Higher education makes the person
more likely to participate in the legal labor market. Blacks and Hispanics have lower
propensities to participate.27
Table 5A presents the crime regressions that employ the NLSY97 data. Potential
market wages of non-workers are imputed using the selection-corrected wage equation
displayed in Table 4 and wages are instrumented by state-year-sector speciﬁc skill-
biased technology parameters. Because non-workers’ sector of work does not exist, we
assigned them the state-and-year speciﬁc skill-biased technology index. The instrument
is powerful with the F-statistics in the range of 127-155.
Real wages have no signiﬁcant impact on robbery or burglary,28 but they impact
arrests for each speciﬁc crime for both juveniles and adults with the total number of people in the
jurisdiction covered by the agencies in the county. In other words, in calculating the juvenile (adult)
arrest rate for, say, larceny, we divide the number of juvenile (adult) larceny arrests by total population.
Ideally, we would use the number of juveniles in the county to calculate the juvenile arrest rates and
the number of adults to calculate the adult arrest rates. However, such information is not provided by
the FBI. As a result, although our measures of the county arrest rates are good proxies for juvenile and
adult arrests, they are lower than their true value. Third, and most important, our sample is mostly
made up of young individuals. The average age is below eighteen. Consequently, the juvenile arrest
rate has a greater weight in the means reported in Table 3. The juvenile arrests make up only a small
portion of total arrests. For example, in 2004, only 16% of all arrests involved a juvenile in the U.S.
Therefore, it is natural to have smaller means for the arrest rates in the individual level analysis.
27The correlation between the errors of the selection and wage equation is negative as it is sometimes
found in other studies (Wright and Ermisch, 1991; Steinberg, (1989)). This is possible in variety of
circumstances. For example a negative correlation emerges if the variance of market wages is smaller
than the covariance between market wages and reservation wages (Ermisch and Wright, (1994)).
28Robbery is a violent crime, where the perpetrator takes or attempts to take something valuable
23all other crime categories. The results indicate that a 1-percent increase in real wages
decreases the propensity to steal something from a store or a purse or wallet (column
2) by about 18 percentage points. The same increase in wages generates a decline in
the propensity to steal a car by 4 percentage points. Similarly, an increase in wages
have a negative impact on participating in other crimes (possession of stolen property,
etc.), selling any drugs, as well as selling hard drugs. The implied elasticies are about
-1.7 for most crime categories.
Arrests reduce criminal proclivity with statistically signiﬁcant impacts in case of
burglary, car theft, larceny, and the indicator that identiﬁes whether the person com-
mitted larceny, robbery or car theft. Heavy drinking, marijuana use and carrying a gun
are positively related to criminal activity.
Table 5B displays the model which includes Wage+ and Wage− as explanatory vari-
ables. Similar to the results obtained from state panels (see Table 2B), the coeﬃcients
of Wage− are larger in absolute value than those of Wage+ indicating that the impact on
the propensity to commit crime of a given decrease in wages is larger than the increase
in wages of the same magnitude. The diﬀerence in the coeﬃcients of Wage+ and Wage−
is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in the models that explain selling hard drugs with
a p-value of 0.02 (column 6), and where larceny/car theft/robbery is the dependent
variable (column 1) with a p-value of 0.07.
The results obtained from estimating the models for men are presented in Tables 6A
and 6B. Wages have a negative and statistically signiﬁcant impact on all crimes with the
exception of robbery and burglary. Table 6B shows that the impact of Wage− is larger
than that of Wage+ as before, and that the diﬀerence in the impact is signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero in case of larceny/car theft/robbery (column 1) and selling hard
drugs (column 6).
When we ran the models for females, the estimated wage coeﬃcients were small and
from the victim by using a weapon or by the threat of violence. Burglary involves entering into a
structure, such as a house, to commit theft.
24statistically not diﬀerent from zero in any crime category. For example, the wage coef-
ﬁcient was -0.097 (std=0.084) in the larceny equation indicating that females’ market
wages have no signiﬁcant impact on their propensity to steal a purse or a wallet, or
to steal something from a store.29 It should be noted this result could be because of
low variation in the dependent variable (less criminal activity for females). Suggestive
evidence for this is that the estimated coeﬃcients are closer to being signiﬁcant in case
of larceny and larceny/car theft/robbery– crime categories with higher participation
rates. An increase in the minimum wage has a negative impact for females in case of
property crimes other than car theft: larceny, and the joint category of larceny/car
theft/robbery.
11 Conclusion
Although formal economic models of crime were developed more than four decades ago,
empirical issues have created substantial obstacles regarding reliable inference about
the magnitudes of the relationships between economic variables and criminal activity.
Inconsistent estimates reported in the literature prompted some analysts to argue that
there was little evidence to support the hypothesis that economic conditions impact
crime and that there was a disconnect between theory and empirical evidence. In the
analysis of the impact of market wages on crime truly exogenous variation in wages
is diﬃcult to ﬁnd, and it has been a tough challenge to come up with convincing and
functional instruments for wages that can be used in aggregate crime regressions. No
study so far has employed an instrumental variables strategy in crime-wage regressions
using micro data.
In this paper we investigate the impact of unskilled (non-college educated) workers’
29The estimated wage coeﬃcients for females (and the standard errors) were as follows in other
crime categories. Car theft: -0.014 (0.020), stolen property: -0.011 (0.026), larceny/car thft/robbery:
-0.094 (0.077), selling drugs: -0.016 (0.046), selling hard drugs: 0.001 (0.027), burglary: 0.010 (0.021),
robbery: 0.013 (0.013).
25earnings on crime using both aggregate (state level) and micro (NLSY97) panel data
sets. Using the framework employed in the literature on wage inequality, and using CPS
data, we create a state-and-year speciﬁc measure of skill-biased technological change
and use it as an instrument for unskilled workers’ earnings.
Estimation of crime regressions using state panels demonstrates that a decrease in
unskilled workers’ real weekly earnings, induced by skilled-biased technological change,
has a positive impact on state property crime with an elasticity of -1.0. Individual com-
ponents of property crime, such as burglary and larceny, are also impacted by unskilled
wages. Violent crime is not inﬂuenced by weekly earnings of unskilled workers. We de-
tect asymmetry in the impact of unskilled workers earnings on crime. A deterioration
in earnings has a larger eﬀect on crime in magnitude in comparison to an increase in
earnings by the same absolute amount.
We also employ micro data from the geo-coded conﬁdential version of the NLSY97
to estimate models of criminal participation. The data set consists of young and mostly
unskilled workers, spanning the years 1997-2003. The NLSY97 contains detailed mea-
sures of individuals’ criminal activity as well as personal and household attributes and
wages, along with information on participation in a variety of crimes, ranging from
theft to selling drugs. Geo-codes allow us to identify the location of the individual
and to merge them with age-speciﬁc (juvenile v. adult) arrest rates in their county of
residence. For those who have not participated in the legal labor market, we impute
wages by jointly estimating a labor force participation equation and a wage equation.
We create state-year-industry speciﬁc measures of skill-biased technological change for
three broad industry categories (manufacturing, service, other) and match workers with
the relevant skill-biased technological change indicators, by their industry. We instru-
ment market wages with state-year-industry speciﬁc technology shocks and ﬁnd wage
elasticities in the neighborhood of -2, which is markedly larger than previous estimates.
The asymmetric impact of wages on crime is also detected in micro data. Market wages
have no signiﬁcant impact on criminal activity of females.
26These results indicate that individual crime decisions respond to labor market in-
centives as predicted by theory, and that variations in unskilled workers’s earnings have





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































29Table 1. Descriptive Statistics (State Panels, 1983{2005)
Standard Deviation
Variable Mean Overall Within-State
Real Weekly Earnings-Unskilled Workers
Reported Earnings (dollars) 680.7 64.4 34.6
Eﬃciency-Adjusted Earnings (dollars) 409.3 42.1 21.6
Crime Rates
Property 4,149.5 1,102.2 605.3
Burglary 949.3 359.5 231.9
Larceny 2,796.3 699.6 364.0
Motor Vehicle Theft 404.0 210.6 110.5
Violent 470.3 238.0 93.9
Murder 6.0 3.4 1.5
Rape 36.0 13.8 6.5
Robbery 133.6 96.4 40.8
Assault 294.6 154.5 61.3
Arrest Rates
Property 14.6 227.3 222.4
Burglary 2.3 30.3 29.7
Larceny 11.5 188.6 184.5
Motor Vehicle Theft 0.8 8.4 8.3
Violent 2.6 20.9 20.5
Murder 0.1 0.8 0.8
Rape 0.3 4.2 4.1
Robbery 0.6 5.4 5.3
Assault 1.7 10.5 10.3
Income Per Capita 22,085.1 7,161.5 6,410.7
Unemployment Rate 5.7 1.9 1.5
Percent 15-24 Year Old 14.9 1.5 1.3
Percent Black 10.0 9.4 0.5
Percent Urban Population 71.2 14.7 2.0
Alcohol Consumption 2,324.4 389.9 139.8
Notes: The crime rates are per 100,000 state population covered by the police agencies that report to
FBI. Arrest rate is calculated as the number of arrests per 1,000 population. Alcohol consumption is


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































34Table 4. NLSY Data; Selection into Labor Force, and Market Wages
Variable Selection Equation Wage Equation
Non Labor Income -0.0001**
(0.00005)
Household Size -0.001 -0.007***
(0.005) (0.002)
























% 15-24 Yr. Old -0.081** 0.034**
(0.035) (0.013)




Notes: Robust standard errors, clustered at the individual level, are in parentheses. * signiﬁes sta-
tistical signiﬁcance at the 10% level; ** at 5% level, and *** at the 1% level or less. State alcohol
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































39A The CPS Data
We use the March Current Population Survey (CPS) ﬁles from 1978 to 2010 (covering
earnings from 1977 to 2009) for full-time workers (those who work 35 or more hours a
week) ages 16 to 64. Self-employed people are dropped from the sample, as are allocated
earnings observations (using individual earnings allocation ﬂags). In constructing the
key variables, we closely follow the previous labor literature on wage inequality (Katz
and Murphy, 1992; Krusell et al., 2000; Card and DiNardo, 2002; and in particular,
Autor et al., 2008).
A.1 Construction of Eﬃciency-adjusted Labor Inputs
Each individual’s average weekly earning is formed by dividing his annual income (from
wages and salaries) by the number of weeks that he worked during the previous year.
Earnings are deﬂated using the state-speciﬁc level price deﬂators from Berry et al.
(2000).30 We make two adjustments for topcoded earnings. First, following Autor et al.
(2008) income of workers with top coded earnings is imputed by multiplying the annual
topcode amount by 1.5. Second, starting in 1996, topcoded earnings values are assigned
the mean of all topcoded earners. In these cases, we simply reassign the topcoded values
to all such observations and again multiply by 1.5. Workers whose weekly earnings below
$70 in 2005 dollars are dropped, as are those non-full-year workers (i.e., those who work
less than 40 weeks) whose weekly earnings exceed 1/40th the top-coded value of weekly
earnings.
We construct the series for high-skill and low-skill labor input and wages as follows.
The data in each year in each state are divided into 24 distinct groups characterized
by 2 sexes, 4 education categories (E 6 11, E = 12, 13 6 E 6 15, and E > 16),31 and
30Berry et al. (2000) have recently extended their original data set to 2007; and we used the updated
series. As an alternative deﬂator, we also used the US PCE index (2005=1) from the BLS as in Autor
et al. (2008). However, results remain qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper.
31Commencing in 1992, the Bureau of the Census changed the emphasis of its educational attainment
question from years of education to degree receipt. To obtain a comparable educational-attainment
40three potential experience categories (0-9, 10-19, 20+ years).32 Potential experience are
calculated as Minfage–years of schooling–6, age–16g following Autor et al. (2008). In
calculating each group’s average weekly earnings, earnings are weighted by the product
of the corresponding CPS sampling weight and weeks worked.
We assume that the high-skill labor class consists of college or college-plus workers
and the workers with some college; and the low-skill labor class consists of those who
have no college education. Groups within a class are assumed to be perfect substitutes
and we use group relative weekly earnings of full-time workers as weights for the aggre-
gation of labor inputs into skilled and unskilled classes. Standard in this literature is
the assumption that relative wages equal relative eﬃciencies of labor. More speciﬁcally,
following Autor et al. (2008), we choose the group that contains male workers with less
than 12 years of education and with less than 10 years of potential experience as the base
group. A relative wage measure is then constructed by dividing each group’s average
weekly earnings by the average weekly earning of the base group. The relative eﬃciency
index measure for each group, qg, is computed as the arithmetic mean of the relative
wage measures in that group over 1977 to 2009. Then the total eﬃciency-adjusted labor








where Ngt represents the total labor weeks used in production by group g in year t.
Since H and L are eﬃciency-adjusted labor inputs, the corresponding earnings WH
and WL in equation (5) are also eﬃciency-adjusted. Following Krusell et al. (2000),








data across years, the classiﬁcation proposed by Jaeger (1997) is followed.
32This taxonomy is the same as in Autor et al. (2008) and many others. However, due to limitations
in the availability of state-level data, we consider a higher level of divisions. Since there are 50 states,
the above taxonomy divides the annual data into 1200 groups.
41where wgt represents the average weekly earnings of group g in year t.
As an alternative measure of earnings, we adjust for the composition of labor input so
that the average weekly earnings of high-skill and low-skill workers are not mechanically
aﬀected by shifts in the experience, gender composition, or average level of completed
schooling (Autor et al., 2008). To this end, for each state, the total weeks for each
group are normalized by the sum of total weeks worked over all groups so that weeks
for each group in each year are expressed as a fraction of total annual weeks (i.e.,
ngt = Ngt/
∑
g Ngt). The composition index for each group, ng, is computed as the















A.2 Industry-State Level Analysis
Construction of the key variables at industrial level follows the same steps. In each state,
we divide industries in three groups: manufacturing, service, and other (agriculture +
mining + construction). Annual data in each industry in each state are divided into
8 distinct groups characterized by 2 sexes and 4 education categories (E 6 11, E =
12, 13 6 E 6 15, and E > 16). In calculating each group’s average weekly earnings,
earnings are weighted by the product of the corresponding CPS sampling weight and
weeks worked. High-skill and less-skill labor classes are the same as above; and while
aggregating labor inputs into skilled and unskilled classes, we choose the group that
contains male workers with less than 12 years of education and with less than 10 years
of potential experience as the base group.
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